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1. INTRODUCTION
A total loss of all heat sinks occurs following a failure
of the primary heat transport pumps, the main feed-water
pumps, the auxiliary feed-water pump, the main moderating
cooling pump, and so on for Wolsong-1 NPP. Under this
accident scenario, the pressurization of the primary heat
transport system (PHTS) can be a threatening risk for the
integrity of the primary pressure boundary.
In an accident of this type, the steam generators (SG)
with the main steam safety valves (MSSV) are the first heat
sink available to evacuate the fuel decay power without
operator intervention. This heat sink will remain efficient
for as long as the SG inventory is available. When the
SG inventory is depleted, the heat exchange between the
primary and the secondary side will degrade, causing the
primary heat transport system (PHTS) to heat up. Swelling
of the PHTS will increase its pressure. The PHTS liquid
relief valves (LRV) and the degasser/condenser relief
valves (DCRV) will become the sole means available to
relieve the PHTS overpressure. 
The DCRV 3332-RV11 and 3332-RV21 provide pro-
tection against overpressure to the degasser/condenser (DC)
tank, which is connected, to the PHTS via the liquid relief
valves (LRV). The two DCRVs (3332-RV11 and RV21)
are spring loaded safety relief valves mounted parallel on
the DC tank. Via a long pipe, this discharge goes directly
to the floor of the reactor’s south vault.
To protect the primary heat transport system during a
total loss of heat sinks accident, a sufficient depressurization
capability of the DCRV and the SG tube integrity by high
temperature steam and differential pressure of steam
generator’s tube wall are very important. The analysis
described here is to determine if the pressure tubes will
fail prior to a containment bypass due to failure of the SG
tubes. The SG tube integrity is determined by the high
temperature steam or the differential pressure between
the PHT pressure and the SG secondary side pressure. 
We conducted our analysis of a total loss of all heat sinks
accident using CATHENA. This is a two-fluid thermal
hydraulic computer code developed by AECL for analysis
of flow transients in reactors and piping networks. This
code has been used for a wide range of thermal hydraulic
applications. This paper describes the analysis of the degasser
/condenser relief valve discharge capacity and the steam
generator tube integrity under a total loss of all heat sinks
using the CATHENA code [1].
A total loss of all heat sinks is considered a severe accident with a low probability of occurrence. Following a total loss
of all heat sinks, the degasser/condenser relief valves (DCRV) become the sole means available for the depressurization of
the primary heat transport system. If a nuclear power plant has a total loss of heat sinks accident, high-temperature steam and
differential pressure between the primary heat transport system (PHTS) and the steam generator (SG) secondary side can
cause a SG tube creep rupture. To protect the PHTS during a total loss of all heat sinks accident, a sufficient depressurization
capability of the degasser/condenser relief valve and the SG tube integrity is very important. Therefore, an accurate
estimation of the discharge through these valves is necessary to assess the impact of the PHTS overprotection and the SG
tube integrity of the primary circuit. This paper describes the analysis of DCRV discharge capacity and the SG tube integrity
under a total loss of all heat sink using the CATHENA code. It was found that the DCRV's discharge capacity is enough to
protect the overpressure in the PHTS, and the SG tube integrity is maintained in a total loss of all heat accident.
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE DEGASSER CONDENSER
RELIEF VALVES 
The main heat transport system, which carries the heat
generated in the reactor core to the steam generators, is a
pressurized heavy water closed loop. The heat transport
pressure and inventory control system is designed to provide
a means of pressure and inventory for this closed loop as
well as to provide adequate overpressure protection [2].
The 3332-RV11 and 3332-RV21 provide protection against
overpressure to the DC tank, which is connected to the
PHTS via the LRV 3332-PV 2/3/12/13 as shown in Figure 1.
The two DCRVs are spring loaded safety relief valves
mounted parallel on the DC tank. Via a long pipe, this
discharge goes directly to the floor of the reactor’s south
vault. The relief valves are proportional lift valves equipped
with a vibration damper. They “pop” open to approximately
50% of their full capacity when the pressure in the D/C
exceeds the set point. If the pressure keeps rising, the
DCRV stem lifts to its maximum opening position. If the
pressure falls, the steam remains at its position until the
pressure is outside the hysteresis band. The valve will
then start to close and follows the pressure drop. This
design protects the valve from chattering. The valve certified
liquid relief capacity is 26.67 kg/s at 110% of the set
pressure and 268 ºC.
Each relief valve acts as a restriction and the liquid
traveling through it experiences a pressure decrease and
an increase in its velocity to maintain a steady flow. The
lowest pressure will occur just downstream of the valve
port at a point. Further downstream of this point, as the
fluid stream expands into a large area, the velocity decreases
and the pressure increases. However, the downstream
pressure never recovers completely to equal the pressure
that existed upstream of the valve [3][4][5][7]. 
3. CATHENA CODE MODELING AND SG TUBE
INTEGRITY CRITERIA
3.1 Code Modeling
The Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 (WSNPP-1)
is a CANDU-6 Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR).
It has 380 horizontal fuel channels surrounded by a cool
low-pressure heavy water moderator. Each fuel channel
is six meters long and contains twelve fuel bundles within
a pressure tube. One bundle consists of 37 elements that
contain natural uranium in the form of compacted sintered
cylindrical pellets of uranium dioxide (UO2). The coolant
enters the channel from an inlet feeder pipe that is connected
to the inlet end fitting. Then, the coolant enters the fuel
string, flowing within the channels between the fuel elements
inside the pressure tube. The coolant leaves the channel
via an outlet feeder pipe that is attached to the outlet end
fitting. The coolant enters the channel at approximately
11 MPa and 263 ºC. 
The core is subdivided into two symmetrically located
figures in two loops. Each loop consists of two core passes
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Fig. 1. PHTS and Auxiliary Circuit of Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1
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of 95 channels each. The core has 380 fuel channels arranged
in 22 rows and 22 columns. In the CATHENA model,
the channel groupings are based on channel power and
elevation. In each core pass, channel groups 1 to 4 contain
high power channels from the inner region of the core;
groups 5 to 7 contain lower power channels from the
periphery of the core. As shown in Table 1, the core con-
figuration is composed of 380 channels, and divided into
two core paths. Each core path has 180 channels and is
simulated as 7 groups of channel height and channel power.
The CATHENA model includes a detailed representation
of the PHTS and the pressure and inventory control network
with DCRV [5]. 
3.1.1 Pressure Tube Failure Model 
The pressure tube circumference is modeled to capture
non-uniform temperature conditions. A model for calculating
the time of pressure tube failure is considered to assess
the pressure tube integrity in CATHENA. Pressure tube
failure is due to local necking at the top as follows [6]:
· Significant temperature gradient top-to-side > 200 ºC
· Prolonged local straining lasting approximately 500 s
· High internal pressure above 10 MPa
At high pressure scenarios, high temperature fuel channel
experiments have shown that non-uniform circumferential
temperature distributions lead to a pressure tube rupture. 
3.1.2 Liquid Relief Valve and Degasser Condenser
Relief Valve Model
During a total loss of all heat sinks accident, which is
called a Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA), the LRVs
are working to open as expected and the steam and water
into the DCT because the electric power is available, the
opening set pressure of the LRVs is 10.34MPa(a).
During BDBA, the reactor would first trip, however
pressure build up in the PHTS would eventually occur due
to the decay heat, which would cause the LRVs open. The
DCT would be filled and the DCRV would open after the
pressure reaches a set point of 10.06 MPa(g). 
We considered the liquid relief valve (LRV) and degasser
condenser relief valve (DCRV) model as in Figure 2. The
PHTS pressure is mainly controlled by LRVs and the
degasser condenser tank (DCT). Hence, LRVs are open,
and the DCT pressure increases as the LRVs discharge
into the DCT. The DCT has spring-loaded safety valves,
which are open to a reactor building (RB) compartment
when the system pressure exceeds 10.16MPa (a). DCRVs
are two 2”x3” (2”; inlet diameter, 3”; outlet diameter)
proportional opening relief valves with the certified water
capacity of 32.3 kg/s, respectively, but to be on the con-
servative side, we assumed 25 kg/s in CATHENA [7].
3.2 Steam Generator Tube Integrity Criteria 
3.2.1 Creep Rupture of Differential Pressure
Under normal operating conditions, the pressure across
a PWR steam generator tube wall, ¨Pno, is § 9MPa (1,300psi);
under a main steam line break (MSLB) in which the sec-
ondary side has dropped to atmospheric pressure, the pres-
sure across the tube wall, ¨PMSLB, is § 18 MPa (2,560psi).
Tubes must actually be capable of withstanding 3·¨Pno §
27MPa (3,900psi) and 1.4·¨PMSLB § 25MPa (3,660psi) to
meet ASME Code and NRC requirements for a sufficient
design margin. The margin is lower for the MSLB because
it is such an unlikely event (§10-5/reactor yr. is the usual
estimated occurrence frequency). These maximum pressure
capabilities are based on rupture or burst of flawed tubes.
For typical unflawed steam generator tubes made of Alloy
600, the burst, Pb, is §65 MPa (9,400psi) [8].
3.2.2 Creep Rupture of Temperature
Materials are open placed in service at elevated tem-
peratures and exposed to static mechanical stress (e.g.,
Loop 1
Core path 1 (headers 2 to 3)
channel group
number
Number of
Channels
channel group
number
Number of
Channels
channel group
number
Number of
Channels
channel group
number
Number of
Channels
Core path 2 (headers 4 to 1) Core path 4 (headers 5 to 8)Core path 3 (headers 6 to 7)
Loop 2
11
12
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
12
12
11
14
16
15
15
21
22
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
12 
11
12
11
14
16
19
31
32
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
12
12
11
14
16
15
15
41
42
43 
44 
45 
46 
47
12 
11
12
11
14
16
19
Table 1. Channel Number Per Channel Group
turbine rotors in jet engines and steam generators that
experience centrifugal stress, and high-pressure steam lines).
Deformation under such circumstance is termed creep.
Defined as the time-dependent and permanent deformation
of materials when subjected to a constant load or stress,
creep is normally an undesirable phenomenon and is often
the limiting factor in the lifetime of a part. It is observed
in all material types; for metals it becomes important only
for temperatures greater than about 0.4 Tm (Tm = absolute
melting temperature) [9, 10].
4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
4.1 Initial Conditions for Analysis
The initiating event is a total loss of all heat sinks,
causing the loss of pumps used in systems such as the
PHTS, moderator cooling, shield cooling, steam generator
feed water, and re-circulating cooling water. Though no
active heat sinks are credited, the accident progression
could be delayed due to the passive heat sinks, particularly
the initial water inventories of the PHTS, moderator, steam
generator secondary side, end shields and reactor vault.
The steam generator ASDVs and CSDVs are assumed to
fail to open. The feed and bleed system, pressurizer heater,
and steam discharge valves of the pressurizer are also not
credited for the analysis. For comparing both code results,
the initial condition input parameters are presented in
Table 2.
4.2 Results and Discussion
The predicted timings of the transient are described
in Table 3. Because the PHTS pumps are not available
due to the loss of power, the fuel heats up and the decay
heat is transferred to the heavy water coolant. A temperature
gradient develops between the coolant in the core and the
steam generator region, which promotes natural circulation
between these two regions. The decay heat is transferred
to the secondary side of the steam generators, which results
in a decrease in the PHTS pressure. Figure 3 shows one
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Fig. 2. CATHENA Model with DCRV
Input Parameter
Reactor Power (%FP)
RIH Pressure (MPa(a))
ROH Pressure (MPa(a))
RIH Temperature (ºC)
ROH Temperature (ºC)
Core Flow per Pass (kg/s)
Heat to Secondary Side per SG (MW)
Pressurizer Level (m)
Steam Generator Level (m)
Total Steam Flow (kg/s)
Time (sec)
103
11.3
10.0
265
311
2,100
516
13.6
1.61
1,076
Table 2. Analysis Assumptions  
flow rate out of four core paths. In addition, the remaining
three paths of flow rates showed the same transient. When
the feedwater pump stops, the pressure of the secondary
system increases, causing the MSSS to open. As shown in
Figure 4, the secondary system coolant is released through
the MSSVs. 
At this point, the secondary side of the steam generators
has sufficient heat sink capacity to absorb the decay heat.
The heat transfer from the PHTS to the steam generators
causes the water in the steam generator secondary side to
boil off. As a result, the pressure in the secondary side of
the steam generators gradually increases and causes the
MSSVs to open and discharge steam from the secondary
side to the environment outside the reactor building. The
water level of the steam generators decreases as the boil
off proceeds. When the water in the steam generators is
depleted at approximately 5,500 secs as shown in Figure 5,
the steam generators dry out and are no longer heat sinks
that can remove heat from the PHTS. As shown in Figure
6, after about 5,500 secs nearly all the liquid has boiled
off from the steam generators. So the PHT pressure rises
more quickly due to the expansion of the PHTS liquid.
The first opening of the LRVs is around 5,600 secs. The
pressure of the primary system constantly stays for about
1,000 secs after 5,500 secs within the opening/closing
setpoints of the LRVs, and the secondary system pressure
stays constant after the flow of MSSVs releases at around
5.0 MPa(a). The degassing condenser pressurizes and
fills with hot PHTS fluid. 
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Fig. 3. Core Flow Transition of the Primary System
Fig. 4. MSSV Discharge Flow Transition
Fig. 5. Secondary System Inventory Transition
Event Sequence
Reactor Trip, PHTS pumps stop, Feedwater
flow to SGs stop 
MSSV open
SG empty
LRV open
DCRV open
DCRV steam discharge
Peak PHTS pressure of 14MPa(a) reached
Time (sec)
0
43
5,500
5,600
6,500
7,500
7,500
Table 3. Event Sequence for Sustained Loss of Heat Sinks
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At this time, the pressure in the degasser condenser
was high enough to cause the DCRVs (3332-RV11 and
3332-RV21) to open. The DCRVs flow increased to the
maximum 25 kg/s at each valve at around 6,600 secs. At
7,500 secs, the DCRV discharge became mostly steam and
the PHTS pressure increased to the maximum 14Mpa (a).
At a given pressure, the valve opening for steam much
less than liquid [6]. The steam relief flow is attained about
10 kg/s until after around 9,000 secs, at which time the
PHTS pressure decreased to 14.5Mpa (a) as in Figure 6.
Figures 8 and 9 show the liquid and steam discharge
trend of the DCRVs. 
After 7,500 secs, the primary system pressure decreased
as a coolant of void was released through the relief valve.
Figure 10 illustrates the maximum pressure tube temperature
transient of the group 4 corresponding to high power channel
group of each core path. In Figure 10, the temperature of
the pressure tube rapidly increased after 8,500 secs and
exceeded 600 ºC. At this time, channel damaging was
expected depending on the channel power and location.
As a result, channel failure occurred at about 8,500 secs. 
The PHTS inventory was gradually lost through the
LRVs, which resulted in fuel channel dryout. The moderator
heated up and the water level in the calandria vessel grad-
Fig. 6. Primary System and Secondary System Pressure Transition
Fig. 7. Primary System Void Fraction
Fig. 8. Liquid and Vapor Discharge Flow of 3342- RV11
Fig. 9. Liquid and Vapor Discharge Flow of 3342 RV21  
ually decreased because the moderator cooling was assumed
to be unavailable. With the loss of the moderator as a
heat sink, the lead channel with the highest decay power
and the smallest inventory in each loop, which had a high
elevation in the calandria vessel, reached CATHENA high
pressures and temperatures such that the lead channel was
unable to sustain the pressures. As a result, the lead channel
ruptured. With the rupture of the lead channel, the PHTS
pressure dropped rapidly at approximately 9,000 secs, as
shown in Figure 11.
At this time the steam generator was filled with vapor.
The porosity of the upper part (SST1: solid line) and the
lower part (SSP1: dotted line) in the steam generator is
shown in Figure 12. The porosity decreased because the
turbine steam flow stopped due to the reactor trip. As
secondary inventory is being decreased by opening MSSVs,
the porosity kept increasing. After the MSSV opening,
because the steam generator water level decreased con-
tinually, the increasing porosity of the SG upper region
was faster than the SG lower region. 
The inside surface temperature transient of the steam
generator is shown in Figure 13. The tube temperature of
SG 1 and SG 3 remained higher than the temperature of
SG 2 and SG 4. This happened because SG 1 and SG 3
are connected to the liquid relief valve. The HD3 and HD7
downstream steam released through the liquid relief valves.
After about 7,000 secs, the steam flow increased in SG 1
and SG 3 before the steam releasing through the liquid
relief valve began in earnest. However, about 1,000 secs
after pressure tube damage, high temperature steam stopped
flowing into the SG tube, and the temperature stopped
increasing and stayed up to 360 ºC or less.
One of the causes of SG U-tube failure is a higher
temperature than 545 ºC (Wolsong NPP Unit 1 Steam
Generator tube Inconel 680 melting temperature: 2,485ÛF
(1,360 ºC), 0.4Tm=1,360x0.4=545 ºC). Another is the dif-
ferential pressure between the PHT pressure and the SG
secondary side pressure. The steam generator tube burst
pressure with the maximum flow as estimated using ASME
code, and the fitness-for-service guideline, is above 27
MPa (d) [6]. 
The maximum SG tube temperature of CATHENA is
below 360 ºC under a total loss of all heat sinks. The dif-
ferential pressure between the primary heat transport system
and the SG secondary side of CATHENA increased to 9
MPa (d) until the degassing relief valves started to release
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Fig. 10. Pressure Tube Temperature Transient of Each Core
Path High Power Channel Group
Fig. 12. SG Secondary Side Void Fraction
Fig. 11. Primary System Pressure Transient After Channel
Tube Failure           
the high-pressure vapor. In our analysis results, the maximum
differential pressure between the PHT pressure and the
SG secondary pressure were below 9 MPa (d) as shown
in Figure 14. 
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the discharge capacity of Wolsong Nuclear
Power Plant Unit 1 DCRVs and the steam generator tube
integrity analysis under a total loss of all heat sinks accident
were analyzed using the CATHENA code. The PHTS
pressure decreased as the LRVs opened. The LRVs remained
open continuously. At this time, the pressure of the degasser
condenser increased and caused the DCRVs to open. The
DCRVs flow increased to a maximum 25 kg/s at each valve
in the fluid phase. The DCRVs discharge became mostly
steam and the PHTS pressure increased to a maximum of
14 MPa (a). Each DCRV flow was about 10 kg/s until
9,000 secs, at which time the PHTS pressure decreased
to 12.5 MPa (a). We confirmed that the DCRVs capacity
was enough to protect overpressure in the PHT system. 
One of the causes of SG tube failure is a temperature
higher than 545 ºC. Another is the differential pressure
between the PHT pressure and the SG secondary side
pressure. The steam generator tube burst pressure with
the maximum flaw as estimated using the ASME code
and fitness-for-service guideline is above 27 MPa (d). Under
the transient, the maximum SG tube temperature was
below 360 ºC and the maximum differential pressure was
below 9 MPa (d). Failure of steam generator tubes is not
expected since they can withstand a differential pressure
of at least 27 MPa (d) based on the ASME code and fitness-
for-service guidelines. We found that the DCRVs discharge
capacity is enough to protect overpressure in the PHTS,
and the SG tube integrity is maintained in a total loss of
all heat accident.
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Fig. 13. SG Tube Wall Temperature Transient
Fig. 14. SG Tube Differential Pressure 
